eruptions of meaning

Let's assume that if you lived near an active volcano 2000 years ago you might have been afraid and had the thought "the gods are angry" when you saw the volcano erupt.

Now transport you to the present: you have just had a 4-hour class on the science of vocanoes and understand what causes them and what happens when they errupt. Again standing at the bottom of the same volcanoe you see it errupt .... has your knowledged changed your experience? You might no longer believe the erruption is caused by the moods of the gods. However if you are close enough I bet you would still be afraid.

What about the color we call "red" what if we could produce a formula (mathematical or descriptive) that defined the colour red? Would knowledge of that formula affect you experience of red? How you thought about the redness of an apple, or enjoyed the red hues of a sunset?

Moving on what about consiousness itself? What if we could explain the conscious experience of "red" in purely physical terms, if we could reduce it to a physical description of the state of a brain? Would this change your experience of "redness"?

Just because we know why something happens does not mean that we cannot harmlessly use incorrect descriptions in a useful way. If I say "the gods are angry" when a thunderstorm arrives it does not matter whether I mean it literally or metaphorically. It is still a useful descriptive shorthand for my feelings about the matter - even if I do not believe what I say.

Would it be just so for consciousness? Would being able to do a brain scan of someone and thereby say what they are experiencing at that moment without asking them take away from the first-person nature of that experience for the subject themselves?

Dying to know ...

I talked yesterday about the vagueness of both words and the way they are used.

Many definitions permit a sliding scale between A and B, between "happy" and "sad" - but why does that matter?

While it may be hard to define words like "sane" and "insane" it it certainly possible to think of examples of each. Why does the point where one becomes the other matter?

It matters because defining the switch-over point helps define the terms at each end of the sane - insane spectrum. It also matters with regards to the law.

If someone violently attacks me and then claims a defense of diminished responsibility due to insanity how do we decided whether he goes to prison or to a hospital for treatment. Maybe his "self" is clearly and explicitly at one end or the other of the spectrum, but what happens if it is not so clear? At what point do we say he should not be punished but receive treatment instead? What if the case is about murder and the decision between sane and insane determines whether a man will live or receive the death penalty?

(This leads to the question of how the choice should not be treatment OR punishment, which I will return to in a later post).

What am I?

I used to cycle 30 miles per week but now I don't cycle and don't even own a bike, am I still okay to call myself a cyclist?

No? Even though in my day I completed a 1000 mile trip through the length of the UK? Maybe you would concede that I *used* to be a cyclist, but that now I am not one? ... Okay, I can accept that, it seems fair enough.

However the more interesting question is when did I stop being a cyclist and instead become a non-cyclist? Was it the day after my last ride, a year later, when I sold my bike?

I find this interesting because when we introduce ourselves we often use labels like "cyclist", "swimmer", "dancer" but the terms are vague, they only give a flavor, a taste, of what we do. They do not define who we are. So we return to the question in the title "What am I?", what defines me as a person as a self?

Self Alteration

Welcome! This is going to be a blog more about thoughts and questions than about answers. However you are welcome to reply to posts and provide any of the above.
On topic comments are always welcome.

Here's some random thoughts one lunchtime to start things off.

How do psychiatric drugs affect our notion of self? Am I "no longer myself" if a drug makes me happy? How is this different to a comedy show making me happy?

What if I am psychotic and a drug helps me think clearly again, which is the real me, my "self"?

How do we define "self" in a practical way?

Does it matter if the "self" is changed by drugs? For example does this change our culpability as moral agents? Some psychiatric drugs can, as a side-effect, cause people to make reckless decisions - who is to blame for the actions?

Does it matter if the self is changed by illness? Bi-polar mania's can lead to reckless behavoir. Who is morally / legally to blame? The person, the illness, the society that does not provide better treatment?

Maybe it does not make sense to blame an illness, it is not as if it could have done otherwise - it is what it is. Society however is a different matter.

Where do you draw the line, if you do choose to draw one at all, between someone being morally responsible for an action or not? There is a certain vagueness here that does not sit well with our usual concepts of Justice being done deciseively.